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ARTICLES
IN AGGRAVATION OF MERGER
G. E. HALEt
ROSEMARY D. HALEt
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLET
In litigation under the anti-merger laws, courts look first to market
definitions. They establish the relevant product and geographic markets
and there normally follows a calculation of market shares. If the acquir-
ing firm already has a fifteen percent share and, by the merger, would
increase that share to twenty percent, the court may well find the
transaction unlawful. Thus when the market share achieved by merger
appears excessive, that fact alone may determine the result of anti-merger
litigation.'
Computation of the market shares, however, may not be conclusive.
A defendant, for example, may tender defenses unrelated to the market
share issue. While the number and character of those defenses may be
narrowly circumscribed, they still maintain at least a formal existence. If,
for example, the acquired enterprise falls into the category of a failing
firm, the merger may be valid despite a calculation of excessive market
shares. True, the test of failing condition is stringent; there nevertheless
exists at least the possibility of establishing facts which will operate
in mitigation of merger.2
Similarly, a plaintiff may tender evidence in aggravation of merger.
Thus if the calculation of market shares proves inconclusive, the plaintiff
may rely on other factors and persuade the court that the acquisition
should be enjoined. In this paper we consider the nature of such "other"
factors.3 We seek to learn to what extent the courts have taken account
of them and to attempt to evaluate the relevance of evidence relating to
matters other than market shares.
" Member, Illinois Bar.
: Lecturer in Economics, Lake Forest College.
1. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
2. Hale & Hale, Failing Firms and the Morger Provisions of the Antitrust
Laws, 52 Ky. L.J. 597 (1964).
3. The subjects of "concentration" and "reciprocity" are omitted from the
present paper. As to the latter, the authors' views are set forth in Hale & Hale,
Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: A Comme nt, 113 U. PA. L. RxEv. 69 (1964).
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AGGRAVATION FACTOR
Intent
In litigation under section 7 of the Clayton Act, as we shall see, good
intentions may be irrelevant. No matter how pure the motives of the
acquiring firm, its merger may nevertheless be deemed unlawful. If, how-
ever, plaintiff can adduce evidence of an intent to eliminate competition
through the acquisition, it will almost surely be admissible in aggravation
of the market share calculation.
Many of the older cases testing the validity of industrial combinations
arose under the Sherman Act. That statute, in section 2, forbids mono-
polization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. Intent
has always been regarded as relevant in litigation thereunder. In one of
the older cases, for example, the court wrote:
[t]here is no limit in this country to the extent to which a
business may grow, and the acquisition of property in the pre-
sent case, standing alone, would not be deemed an illegal mono-
poly; but when such acquisitions are accompanied by an intent
to monopolize and restrain interstate trade by an arbitrary use
of the power resulting from a large business to eliminate a
weaker competitor, then they no doubt come within the meaning
of the statute.4
The Sherman Act cases have also condemned combinations characterized
as a "calculated purchase for control." 5 However vague that phrase may
be deemed, the word "calculated" clearly implies that the intent of the
acquiring firm is taken into account. Such a "calculated purchase" is
often contrasted-unfavorably-with "normal industrial development."'
While section 7 of the Clayton Act was surely designed to operate
to bar certain mergers even in the absence of evidence of wrongful
intent such evidence is relevant in a proceeding under that section:
4. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 80 (W.D.N.Y. 1915),
decree granted, 230 F. 522 (W.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921).
5. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947); United States
v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147
F.2d 93, 111 (6th Cir. 1944), afrd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); In re American Fuel &
Power Co., 122 F.2d 223, 228 (6th Cir. 1941).
6. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 73, 75 (1911); Dunbar v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 IIl. 456, 483, 486, 87 N.E. 521, 532, 533 (1909). See M.
HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAws 487 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941) ; R. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AimE-
ICAN INDUSTRY 103, 105 (1959). Intent is particularly important when an attempt to
monopolize is alleged, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-32
(1948).
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[w]hile the Government is not required to establish the defen-
dant's motive or intent in entering into this transaction, evidence
of motive or intent is admissible as it may possibly cast an illu-
minating light on what actually transpired.'
So, when an acquisition was found to have been actuated by a desire to
remove a price cutting "thorn" from the sides of the acquiring firm's
customers, it was condemned.' Thus despite the absence of a necessity
therefor, it is not uncommon to find mention of wrongful intent in
opinions holding acquisitions unlawful under the Clayton Act.9
We have suggested that intent may be more relevant in anti-merger
suits under the Sherman Act than in those founded upon section 7 of
the Clayton Act. Indeed, failure to demonstrate wrongful intent has
proved fatal to a plaintiff's case under the 1890 legislation. When
persuaded that the defendant acted without intent to monopolize, the
courts were apt as late as 1931 to refer to the acquisition as motivated
by "sound business reasons" and to condone it.'" That is the ancient
distinction between the "good trust" and the "bad trust.""
No such line has been drawn in litigation under the Clayton Act.
Conceived as "structural" in character, that legislation is called into
play without proof of malevolent purpose. Thus in the famous United
States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. case the Court wrote: "[i]t is
not requisite to the proof of a violation of §7 to show that restraint or
monopoly was intended."'1 2  It follows that proof of good intentions
should be rejected. In some instances, however, the courts-probably
inadvertently-have hinted that the rule is not inflexible."
7. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Prod. Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 804(D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
S. Id. at 805.
9. Ekco Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 1965); Western Meat
Co. v. FTC, 1 F.2d 95, 99 (9th Cir. 1924), modified, 4 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1925),
modified, 272 U.S. 554 (1926) ; United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp.
156, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), clarified, 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718, 727 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 382 U.S. 12
(1965) ; Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 H. Rv L. REV. 226, 324 (1960).
10. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F.2d 288, 310-11 (E.D. Mo. 1931);
accord, United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 533 (1948); cf. United
States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 861 (D. Md.), decree considered, 234 F. 1019 (D.
Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921). A different view appears to have been
expressed in United States v. First National Bank, 208 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Ky.
1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 665, 669 (1964).
11. A. KALES, CONTRACTS AND ComxBixAIoNS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE, § 92 (1918).
12. 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957), rev'g 126 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Ill. 1954). Accord,
Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 F. 401, 408 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S.
616 (1923).
13. United States v. Continental Oil Co., 1965 Trade Cas. 81,537 (D.N.M. 1965),
vacated, 387 U.S. 424 (1967). Cf. Transamerica Corp. v. Parrington, 115 Cal. App. 2d
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What kind of evidence is admissible to demonstrate intent in anti-
merger litigation? In some instances the mere fact of acquisition has
suggested a wrongful intent. Buying up rival firms, it was hinted in the
old Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States case, gave rise to a
presumption of intent to monopolize. 4 The opinions which refer to a
"calculated purchase for control"' 5 may rest on the same concept: that
the fact of acquisition demonstrates the malevolence of the acquirer. In
the same manner, courts which speak of a merger as fulfilling a "normal
business purpose" seem to base the loose characterization upon the fact
of acquisition. Such reasoning is difficult to follow. It is true, of course,
that the acquiring firm has demonstrated an intent to make an acquisition.
But this does not necessarily indicate that the firm has evidenced an
appetite for monopolization. The books are full of instances in which
mergers have been actuated, at least in part, by other factors such as the
reaping of promoters' profits, minimization of taxes, etc.'" By naming
other facts suggesting wrongful intent, some courts have indicated that
the fact of acquisition itself should not be taken as evidence of wrongful
motive. The fact, for example, that a premium price was paid for the
acquired stock has been noted as evidence pointing to an improper
intent.' 7
346, 252 P.2d 385 (1953) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1933),
aff'd per curiam, 291 U.S. 651 (1934) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214
F. Supp. 501, 516 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
14. 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911), aff'g 173 F. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1909). Accord, Shawnee
Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423, 433 (1908). Possibly the mergers create a
presumption of intent to dominate and control industry. United States v. Great Lakes
Towing Co., 208 F. 733, 742 (N.D. Ohio 1913), decree granted, 217 F. 656 (N.D. Ohio
1914).
15. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920). Cf. United States v.
Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 F. 733, 742-43 (N.D. Ohio 1913), decree granted,
217 F. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1914).
16. United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 866 (D. Md.), decree granted,
234 F. 1019 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921) ; Butters, Taxation, In-
centives and Financial Capacity, in H. LEVIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY: A BOOK OF READINGS 187, 194 (1958); CHEATHAM, THE GEORGIA-PAcIFIC STORY
16-17 (1966) ; Hamill, Bert Gamble, FORTUNE, Oct. 1960, at 180; E. MARKHAM, SURVEY
OF THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS ON MERGERS IN BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND
PRICE POLICY 141 (Stigler ed. 1955). Note the interesting empirical test suggested in
Stigler, The Dominant Firm and the Inverted Umbrella, 8 J. LAw & EcoN. 167 (1965).
17. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966) ; People v.
American Ice Co., 135 App. Div. 180, 120 N.Y.S. 41 (Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd nem. 140
App. Div. 912, 125 N.Y.S. 1136 (Sup. Ct. 1910). One might think that the courts
would pay some attention to whether the acquiring firm or the acquired enter-
prise took the initiative in negotiating the acquisition. The authorities, however, tend to
disregard that fact. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, 151 F.2d 461 (6th
Cir. 1945), modification denied, 153 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 737
(1946); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 447 (N.D. Cal.
1967) ; Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 32 (1956). Note the interesting example of a
merger motivated by family considerations set forth in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 75 (May 1955).
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Should the courts take account of intent in litigation under the anti-
merger laws ? In recent years emphasis has been placed on the "structural"
aspect of mergers. Legality has been made heavily dependent upon
market shares; "behavior" and "performance" have been given relatively
minor weight. If the "structure" achieved by the merger seemed to
threaten competition, then illegality followed without much further in-
quiry. 8 In that atmosphere little reason appears for inquiry into motives.
The argument in favor of considering intent points to weaknesses
in the "structure" concept. "Structure" depends almost entirely upon a
calculation of market shares. That calculation, in turn, is founded upon
product and geographic market definitions. Contrary to common impres-
sion, those definitions are far from precise. In a single decision, for
example, we are advised that the commodity in question should be
defined as containers made both of tinplate and glass but not plastics
and other materials. Judges have exchanged sharp views on the inter-
changeability of aluminum and copper cables. Even greater doubts have
been expressed with respect to the propriety of some definitions of
geographic markets. In such circumstances it surely would be odd to
exclude evidence which might cast light upon the ultimate issues."x
Beware what follows. If our reason for admitting evidence of
intent is our fear that the "structure" test is weak, it follows that good
intentions are just as relevant as bad. "Sound business reasons," whatever
they may be, are just as probative as a "calculated purchase for control."
There is no logical reason, in short, to consider the acquiring firm's
wicked motives unless its benevolent designs are likewise deemed material.
There remains the interesting situation in which motive is clearly
malevolent but no impairment of competition can be envisaged. Here the
parallel is to a charge of attempted assault and battery when the weapon
is a feather duster. A defendant may have every intention of destroying
his price-cutting competitor and removing him from the market place.
Unless, however, he has some means of doing so, the intent alone would
not seem to amount to a violation of the law. In other words, even under
Clayton Act tests, there must be some impact upon competition or
prospect thereof before the combination may be deemed unlawful.
Unless the "structure" test rests on a foundation of unquestioned
firmness, intent should be relevant in anti-merger litigation. Both "good"
and "bad" motives should be considered. And the weight accorded that
evidence should vary inversely with the strength of the "structure" test
18. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957),
rcv'g 126 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Ill. 1954); Barnes, The Primacy of Competitiol and the
Brown Shoe Decision, 51 GEO. L. J. 706, 739 (1963).
19. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Prod. Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 804
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in that suit. If the parties do not question the market definitions and if no
difficulties arise in calculating market shares, intent may be nearly
disregarded and vice versa.
Idle Capacity
In a good many cases the courts have mentioned the holding of idle
capacity as a reason for condemning a merger. In the older cases a
typical pattern started with the combination of competing concerns
followed by the shutting down of one or more of the acquired plants. The
fact that the combined concern thus deliberately removed a portion of the
supply of goods which would otherwise have been available was held
relevant in passing upon the validity of the merger.2" Idle capacity
following the acquisition is thus taken in aggravation of merger.
In many instances the courts are, no doubt, on sound ground. The
conduct of the defendants suggests an effort to shift the supply schedule
and, hence, to raise prices." Evidence of excess capacity is not, however,
unequivocal. Several valid explanations could be tendered to show why a
plant was not worked to capacity following an acquisition. Ignorance of
market conditions might be one-instances can be cited in which failure
to operate at capacity appears to arise out of misinformation.22 Mis-
management may lead to financial stringency, preventing full operation of
(D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
20. United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), rev'd, 221 U.S.
106, 157 (1911); Love v. Kozy Theater Co., 193 Ky. 336, 236 S.W. 243 (1922).
But cf. Sandidge v. Rogers, 167 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Ind. 1958). Note the order of
reasoning in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 124 (N.D. Ohio
1935). In that case it was said that the enormous excess capacity in the industry as a
whole prevented the plaintiff from showing a purpose of lessening competition through
the merger.
21. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARzv. L. REv.
1289, 1298 (1948); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws, FINAL REPORT, § VII C/2 (1955). Cf. R. HARROD, EcoNomIc ESSAYS 152
(1952).
22. A famous example occurred when Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot
mistakenly announced that reserves of timberland in the United States were almost
exhausted. They made that statement in a campaign against waste and in favor of
conservation. Lumber companies and speculators took the statement at face value and
bid up the price of timber. As a result there was vast "over-production" and "ruinous
competition" resulting in numerous bankruptcies. Bunyan in Broadcloth: The House of
Weyerhaeuser, FORTUNE, Apr. 1934, at 174, 176. Another example is recounted in Inter-
national Power & Paper, FORTUNE, May 1930, at 69. Note the views of a long-time stu-
dent of the antitrust laws:
Excess capacity tends to be treated by theory as a monopolistic symptom,
but in antitrust cases it may or may not be so treated, depending on cir-
cumstances. And businessmen tend to the view that competition does not
begin until they have difficulty disposing of capacity output and becomes
more severe as excess capacity gets larger.
Clark, Competition: Static Models and Dynamic Aspects, 45 PROC. Aie. EcoN. Ass'x 450,
453 (1955).
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equipment. Also, a shift in the demand curve, or an anticipated shift,
could cause similar results. A good deal may depend upon the elasticity
of demand for the product. Hence the mere fact that the acquiring firm
has not worked at maximum capacity levels should not alone be con-
clusive in adjudicating the validity of a merger.23 Unless explained,
however, it does seem worthy of consideration.
Courts have taken particular note of the dismantling of acquired
plants. 4 Evidence that the combination deliberately destroyed part of
its own capacity to produce is scarcely susceptible of any except adverse
inferences. 5 It is, by definition, a long run phenomenon and cannot be
dismissed as the product of unexpected short term factors. No doubt
explanations could be found; they should, however, be convincing.
Existence of idle capacity prior to the acquisition appears not to have
been the subject of judicial comment. If both the acquiring and acquired
firm are operating at less than full capacity, that fact might support a
suspicion that the merger was intended as part of a move toward "ration-
alization" of the industry. If, on the other hand, one of the firms had an
idle plant and the other needed additional capacity (as evidenced, perhaps,
by the receipt of more orders than it could fill), an entirely different
inference must be drawn.
Is it relevant that, before or after the merger, the parties to the
merger have been working at capacity? As in the case of intent, a two
way street seems indicated. If there has been no idle capacity that fact
would appear relevant so long as we bear in mind that, as indicated
above, many other factors may account for the absence of excess plant.
A shift in the demand curve, for example, may account for full production
just as a shift in the opposite direction may explain the existence of idle
facilities.
Pricing
In litigation challenging the legality of industrial combinations, it
has been traditional to consider "abuses." Predatory price cutting has
23. Clark, The Concept of "Workable" or "Effective" Competition 6 (Jan. 5, 1954)(Tentative draft submitted to Attorney General's National Comm. to Study the Anti-
trust Laws) ; 1955 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Co, mm. ANTITRUST REP. 332-33.
24. United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 875 (D. Md.), decree granted,
234 F. 1019 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921) ; United States v. East-
man Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 69 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), decree granted, 230 F. 522 (W.D.N.Y.
1916), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921) ; United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
164 F. 700 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), rev'd, 221 U.S. 106, 163, 166, 183 (1911); United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 254 (D.R.I. 1964), mnodified, 384 U.S. 563(1966) ; Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People ex rel Moloney, 156 Ill. 448, 465,
41 N.E. 188 (1895).
25. H. WI.LIAmtSoN, WINcHEsTER: THE GUN THAT WON THE WEST 58 (1952);
A. NEVINS, STUDY IN POWER: JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, INDUSTRIALIST AND PHILAN-
THROPIST 256, 285 (1953).
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constituted the classic form of "abuse." If, after its formation, the
combination indulges in price cutting, particularly temporary price reduc-
tions localized as to area or product, courts have seized upon that conduct
as an additional reason for invalidating the acquisition. A combination
found guilty of such behavior is the traditional "bad trust."2
Interestingly enough, raising prices may be equally detrimental to
the validity of the merger. If the acquisition was made, for example, to
eliminate a price cutting competitor, it may well be unlawful." And the
fact that the acquiring firm subsequently raised prices has often been
noted as a factor adverse to the validity of the acquisition.2"
It follows that a merger will be somewhat less subject to challenge
if the firm's prices remain unchanged. Presumably the period during
which pricing is relevant to the validity of a merger extends to the time
when upward or downward price fluctuations are attributable to other
causes. We shall consider below the desirability of taking pricing and
other "abuses" into account in litigation under the anti-merger laws.
Misbehavior Generally
Price changes are by no means the only type of conduct considered
by the courts in anti-merger litigation."' Often covenants not to compete
are mentioned in opinions invalidating mergers. Such covenants are
frequently secured by the acquiring firm from the natural persons
associated with the acquired firm and, of course, a considerable body of
law has developed with respect to their validity apart from the anti-
merger laws."0 In recent years the practice of "reciprocity" has been
26. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), miodifying 173 F. 177
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1909); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
Cf. Procter and Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 386 U.S. 568
(1967); Sandidge v. Rogers, 167 F. Supp. 553, 559 (S.D. Ind. 1958). See A. KALES,
CONTRACTS AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE § 49 (1918) ; M. HANDLER, A
STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
51 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941).
27. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Prod. Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 805-06
(D.D.C. 1958), modified, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). (One of defendant's motives in the
acquisition of a dairy was elimination of price-cutting which had hurt its customers.)
28. Farm Journal, Inc. 53 F.T.C. 26, 33, 42 (1956); Harding v. American
Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 640, 55 N.E. 577, 620 (1899); Hadley v. Standard Oil Co.,
218 Mo. 1, 336, 116 S.W. 902, 1042 (1909), aff'd, 224 U.S. 270 (1912). Query whether
price leadership might be given similar effect. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769,
788 (1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961). The mere fact that the defendants
made profits hardly seems relevant. But see United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co.,
208 F. 733, 744 (N.D. Ohio 1913), decree granted, 217 F. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1914).
29. Use of violence might well be taken into account. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers', Local 753, 371 Ill. 377, 389, 21 N.E.2d 308, 314 (1939),
aff'd, 312 U.S. 257 (1941).
30. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948);
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 181 (1944) ; Shawnee
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deemed a factor in aggravation of merger."1 Since reciprocity was not
previously deemed unlawful, such decisions suggest the possibility that a
host of practices might be deemed "abuses" for purposes of anti-merger
litigation. A long term contract, for example, not otherwise objectionable,
might be deemed an "abuse" on the ground that third parties could not
compete for the business while it remained in effect. 2
As was noted in connection with the matter of intent, the anti-
merger laws today and particularly section 7 of the Clayton Act focus on
industrial structure. The notion is that monopoly (and, perhaps, oligo-
poly) should be prevented. We do not look to see whether or not there
have been predatory practices; power to move prices up (or down) is
presumed from the structure resulting from the acquisition. Thus there
will be no need to determine whether the combination constitutes a "good
trust" or a "bad trust." The "good" or "bad" performance of the firm
after the acquisition is, in this view, irrelevant. 3 It would follow that
evidence of pricing and other "abuses" should not be received.
There are other reasons for deeming the conduct of the firm
irrelevant. "Bad" performance does not necessarily indicate that monopoly
has been achieved. True, in many instances, some degree of monopoly
power may afford a "base" for the indulgence of predatory practices. A
firm cannot engage in pricing below cost, for example, unless it enjoys
reserves. Those reserves may be created by the existence of some degree
of monopoly power. They may, however, also be derived purely from
wealth; the enterprise diversified into many product lines may enjoy ag-
gregate cash resources to finance forays designed to drive rivals from the
field without holding monopoly power in any single market.34 Again, at
Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423, 433 (1908); United States v. Great Lakes
Towing Co., 208 F. 733, 745 (N.D. Ohio 1913), decree granted, 217 F. 656 (N.D. Ohio
1914) ; Armour & Co., 4 F.T.C. 457, 463 (1922).
31. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) ; United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), 258 F. Supp. 36
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (reciprocity). But cf. United States v. FIIC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817,
819 (N.D. Cal. 1963), appeal dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963).
32. In Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769, 788 (1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800(9th Cir. 1961), the rationing of paper to its customers by the defendant was noted
with disapproval. It was also pointed out that the size of minimum orders had been
increased after the acquisition. Id. at 794. An attempt to purchase prior to a merger
has been noted adversely. Inland Container Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. f1 17,012, at 22,118 (FTC 1964). What effect would be given a contract
providing that one firm could inspect another's books of account? United States v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 169 F. Supp. 888, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Heavy advertising
expenditures might also be deemed relevant. On that subject note the recent investigation
reported in Else, The Incidence of Advertising in Manufacturing Industries, 18
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 88 (1966).
33. Rostow, Market Organization and Stabilization Policy, in INCoIE STABILIZA-
TION FOR A DEVELOPING EcoNomY 511 (Millikan ed. 1954).
34. If the merged firm engages in price-fixing after the acquisition, it might
indicate either that alone it did not enjoy monopoly power or that the merger had so
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the other extreme, the small businessman with neither wealth nor mono-
poly power may be able to engage in questionable practices, such as fraud.
A further argument against entertaining evidence of "abuses" rests
on the ambiguous nature of the alleged misconduct. It is odd, to say the
least, that both reducing and raising prices should be deemed factors
reflecting adversely on the validity of a merger. Some observers think
they can identify predatory price cutting; without going into the entire
literature of pricing, it is easy to point to reasons why price reductions
should not taint mergers. 5 Again, higher prices can often be explained
by factors extraneous to the merger." In one view, the restrictive coven-
ant is a sinister device; in another, it merely assures delivery of the
good will purchased by the acquiring firm.
Looking in the opposite direction are the same arguments which are
adduced to support consideration of intent in merger cases. "Structure,"
it is said, is a shaky edifice upon which to support findings of injury to
competition. Market definitions may be so arbitrary as to deprive the
entire concept of firm foundations.3" Again, if intent is relevant in a
merger proceeding, behavior may shed considerable light upon motive.
The recently amalgamated firm which turns on its competition with a
combination of price cutting and fraud may demonstrate an appetite for
monopoly which, if not conclusive, can scarcely be overlooked. Again,
while mergers do not necessarily confer monopoly power and monopoly
power is not a prerequisite for the commission of acts of misbehavior,
there may be a relationship between the two.38 It is not urged that
conduct be made the test of legality but that it not be disregarded.
Up to this point we have been speaking of conduct following the
acquisition. All the decided cases refer to price cutting or other mis-
behavior following formation of the combination. Are the same considera-
tions applicable to pre-merger conduct? A leading economist has urged
that such conduct is relevant because the acquiring firm's behavior prior
reduced numbers in the industry to the point where price-fixing became feasible. Cf.
Williamson, A Dynamic Theory of Interfirm Behavior, 79 Q.J. EcoN. 579, 601 (1965).
35. 1955 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comzr. ANTITRUST REP. 331; Mason, The C'urrent
Status of the Monopoly Problem i& the United States, 62 HARV. L. P\v. 1265, 1281
(1949) ; Telser, Abusive Trade Practices: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 488 (1965). Should holding prices down to discourage entry constitute aggravation
of a merger?
36. There may, for example, have been shifts in demand.
37. C. GRIFFIN, AN EcoNo ic APPROACH TO ANTITRUST PROBLEMS, ch. VII
(1951); Adelman, Business Size and Public Policy, 24 J. Bus. 269, 273 (1951);
Mason, The Current Stats of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62
HARV. L. Rv. 1265, 1280 (1949).
38. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), clarified, 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (reciprocity).
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to the acquisition may shed light on its intent.89 It indicates even less
than post-merger behavior, however, as to whether or not the merger
itself resulted in the acquisition of some degree of monopoly power. Its
relevance would therefore usually appear remote.
We have considered whether "bad" conduct, before or after the
acquisition, should be deemed relevant in adjudicating the validity of
the merger. There remains the relevance of good conduct. Here the courts
have been divided. In some instances the fact that the amalgamated firm
has eliminated fraud and financial irresponsibility in an industry has
been deemed immaterial.4" In other instances courts have given weight
to evidence of good conduct. One of the factors which saved the United
States Steel Corporation from dissolution, for example, was the price
stability which its formation brought to the industry. Wide price fluctua-
tions, with accompanying speculation, apparently were eliminated by
the combination. Today a court might take a jaundiced view of such
evidence but at least the lower tribunal was impressed thereby in 1915."'
And it is not inconceivable that a court today might be impressed by
similar evidence if it related, for instance, to prices paid to sugar beet
gTowers.
Should evidence of good conduct be admissible? If one admits
testimony concerning "bad" behavior because he is fearful of relying
solely on the "structure" test, it follows that "good" behavior should be
equally relevant. At the same time, the courts should be fully aware of
the hazards inherent in that procedure: characterizing conduct as "good"
or "bad" takes us into the realm of morals. Here our society shows great
bewilderment. Sanctimonious talk about serving two masters decorates
an opinion holding that a remote conflict of interest situation avoids a
contract favoring private rather than public production of electric
power." But the same judges find no difficulty in approving a system
of soliciting legal retainers denounced by the dissenting opinion as a
patent violation of the cardinal ethics of the legal profession. 3 With
39. Stigler, 11ergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
176, 180 (1955).
40. United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 F. 733, 740, 743-44 (N.D. Ohio
1913), decree granted, 217 F. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1914). Cases, however, can 'be cited to
the contrary. United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518, 525 (D.NJ.
1965) ; United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 893 (D. Md.), decree granted, 234
F. 1019 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
41. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 90, 91, 96 (D.NJ.
1915) ; affid, 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
42. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549 (1961).
43. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (dissenting
opinion). Cf. In re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 190, 139 N.E.2d 301, 305 (1957). Note the
complaint that legal concepts have been manipulated by courts to achieve predetermined
results. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 284-87 (1964).
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such enigmatic notions of what is "good" and "bad," courts may well
hesitate to give much weight in anti-merger litigation either to misbe-
havior or the lack of it.
Prior Acquisitions
On the assumption that there may be such a thing as a lawful
merger and that such a thing would not necessarily amount either to
good or bad conduct, we have reserved the question of prior acquisitions.
That question is: does the fact that the acquiring firm has made earlier
purchases of enterprises weigh against it in considering the present
acquisition?
To this question the courts have shown no hesitation in tendering
an affirmative answer. In case after case, the courts have ticked off
prior acquisitions upon the part of the defendant as a reason for holding
the instant merger invalid. In the opinion holding that Continental can
wrongfully acquired Hazel Atlas Glass, for example, the Court recited
Continental's previous mergers with twenty-one can makers, fourteen
manufacturers of paper containers, and four producers of glass closures.4
Similar recitations appear in many other opinions." Sherman Act
cases, as well as those brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act, take
a similar stance'6 and the Federal Trade Commission has likewise
joined the parade.17
Occasionally a court notes prior acquisitions and shrugs them off
as irrelevant or, conceivably, as favorable to the defendant on the theory
that failure to challenge them constituted acquiescence by the enforce-
ment agencies.48 It is worth remarking, however, that several of the
lower court opinions questioning the relevance of prior acquisitions
44. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1964).
45. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 302 (1962) ; United States v.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 600 (1957) ; Aluminum Co. of America
v. FTC, 284 F. 401, 406 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923), petition for
amendment of decree denied, 299 F. 361 (3d Cir. 1924) ; United States v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (N.D. Cal. 1967); United States v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 136 (N.D. Cal. 1966) ; United States v.
Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 943-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), inotion for
summary judgment denied, 157 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
46. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 312
(D. Mass. 1953), af!'d nem., 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
47. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1082 (1962) ; Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,
57 F.T.C. 1274, 1391 (1960) ; Scott Paper Co., 57 F.T.C. 1415, 1441 (1960), rev'd,
301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962).
48. United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 818, 821 (N.D. Cal. 1963),
appeal dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Ling-Temco Elect-
ronics, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. 78,646 (N.D. Tex. 1961). Cf. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554 (1967) (introduction of evidence in criminal trial of prior convictions when relevant
to habitual criminal count of indictment is not denial of due process) ; Ekco Prod. Co. v.
FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 746 (7th Cir. 1965).
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were reversed on appeal."9
The situation in which a series of acquisitions is attacked in a
single suit must be distinguished. If the prior acquisition is itself
attacked in the complaint, its relevance is clear.50A delicate line drawing
problem may arise in such a case, as the court said in the United States v.
Jerrold Electronics Corp. opinion: "[t]he court is faced with the prop-
osition of deciding when the defendant has gone too far where each acqui-
sition lessens competition almost immeasurably. Yet at some point the cu-
mulative effect of these acquisitions will reach prohibited proportions."'"
The basic problems in a case challenging a series of acquisitions, how-
ever, are no different from those arising out of a single merger. The
court may be forced to examine each transaction but the law applicable
to each is the same. If each acquisition has added to the defendant's
market share, the stopping point is simply that percentage point which
the law would disallow if a single merger had taken place.
We return to the situation in which only one acquisition is challenged
and the plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence as to prior acquisitions.
Such evidence, of course, is admissible to the extent necessary to calculate
the defendant's current market share. But does it have further relevance?
Possibly earlier acquisitions may shed light on the defendant's intent
and, as suggested above, intent may be relevant. Unlike misbehavior,
however, there is nothing inherently illegal or immoral about a prior
acquisition. Indeed, to the extent that it remains unchallenged, there may
be some presumption that it is lawful. It is therefore difficult to under-
stand upon what rationale the courts have so enthusiastically entertained
evidence with respect to earlier merger activity. 2
Much the same considerations are applicable to acquisitions following
the challenged transaction. One should take account of them in calculating
market shares, and possibly they would be relevant on the issue of
intent. 3  The failure to challenge the later acquisitions-by supple-
49. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rcv'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp.
348, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
50. United States v. New England Fish Exchange, 258 F. 732, 751 (D. Mass.
1919), modification of decree denied, 292 F. 511 (D. Mass. 1923); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), rev'd, 221 U.S. 106, 157-60
(1911).
51. 187 F. Supp. 545, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
52. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HAnv. L. Rav. 226, 338 (1960) ; Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration
of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 629, 667-68 (1961).
53. Cf. Bender v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'g 152 F. Supp.
569, 578 (D. Conn. 1957). Can subsequent acquisitions demonstrate the existence of
market power arising from the challenged acquisition? Conceivably, but market
power is not usually a prerequisite to mergers.
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mental complaint if necessary-is even more conspicuous than in the
case of prior mergers. Since the parties are already in court, there is little
excuse for the plaintiff not to question subsequent transactions. Failure
to do so must give rise to something like a presumption of validity.
If it is permissible to introduce evidence of prior mergers in
aggravation of the present offense, can the defendant rely on the absence
of such earlier acquisitions? There is a hint in one case that it can."'
If so, it would likewise appear permissible to prove that the defendant
had divested itself voluntarily of various portions of its business in
prior years. Such sales are by no means rare. It is said, for example,
that the four largest meat packers, in the six years 1947-1964, acquired
fifty-eight facilities and simultaneously disposed of fifty-six plants.55
Do the voluntary divestitures offset the prior acquisitions? Nothing in
the authorities suggests the answer to that question. If one follows the
courts, however, in admitting evidence of prior acquisitions, testimony
with respect to voluntary dispositions seems equally relevant, which
is not to say that it is entitled to much weight.
Barriers to Entry
It is well established that a monopoly cannot exploit the consumer
if entry into the market is sufficiently easy. Accordingly, a good argu-
ment can be made that there is no need for anti-merger litigation in
easy-entry industries. 6 Does it follow that the existence of barriers to
entry should be taken into account as an adverse factor in determining
54. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
55. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FOOD MARKETING, LIvESTOCK AND MEAT INDUSTRY,
TECHNICAL STUDY, NO. 1, at 25 (1966). Note the following excerpts from a Federal
Trade Commission study:
The General Foods Corp.'s aggressive acquisition policy appears to be
matched by an equally active divestment policy based on continuing survey
of the rates of return on its capital investments. In a statement made by a
spokesman for the corporation in November 1953, it was pointed out that the
firm's pattern for development required that it achieve growth through profit-
ability rather than merely through increased sales, and that it is interested
in acquiring other companies with long profit margins rather than those with
large sales and short profits. In this connection, in the corporation's 1953
annual report it is pointed out that as a business grows and acquires new
product lines, its character constantly undergoes change, and that the company
must examine itself periodically to make sure that each operation continues
to contribute its share to the company's profitability and growth. It is pointed
out further, that, as a result of such a study during the previous year,
General Foods decided to dispose of several businesses whose rates of earnings
on. the funds invested were below the level considered adequate for growth.
It withdrew from the salt, tomato condiment, and shrimp businesses by selling
the assets and goodwill of its Diamond-Crystal-Colonial Salt operation,
Snider condiment business, and General Seafoods shrimp operations.
FTC, CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 74-75 (May 1955).
56. Goyden, Public Control of Mergers, 28 MODERN L. REv. 654, 664 (1965).
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the legality of an acquisition?
There appears to be little authority bearing directly on this question,
although it would seem rational to answer the question in the affirmative.
It is usually thought that barriers to entry impose burdens on con-
sumers."' Accordingly, their impact should be offset by insisting on
small market shares in an industry protected by such barriers.
A different question is raised by the allegation that the challenged
merger has, itself, increased barriers to entry. The Federal Trade Com-
mission took that position in the General Foods Corp. case." According
to the Comnission, General Foods' acquisition of a firm in the steel
wool pad business heightened the "factual and psychological barriers to
entry to that market.""5 The Commission took a similar position in the
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. case and the United States Supreme
Court, in approving the Commission's order, specifically adverted to
increased difficulty of entry as a reason for finding the merger unlawful."
It is conceivable that such a merger might demonstrate the existence
of economies of scale. General Foods, for example, might achieve cost
savings by distributing a multitude of products to retail stores. Once
such efficiency has been demonstrated, outsiders will be reluctant to
enter into the manufacture of steel wool pads unless they are prepared
simultaneously to market other products which are bought by retailers.
It is also conceivable that a would-be developer of a better steel wool pad
might be deterred by the knowledge that General Foods is in that
business and has ample resources to devote to research and development.
Finally, a would-be entrant will know that General Foods can afford to
engage in predatory practices. However, none of the foregoing rationales
is particularly persuasive. If General Foods has raised barriers to entry
by its acquisition, the challenged transaction, by the same reasoning, has
increased competition in that market. If so, that evidence would appear
equally admissible in mitigation of the merger.
Let us return to the situation in which it is alleged merely that
entry into the industry generally is difficult (as opposed to an allegation
that it has been made more difficult by the acquisition). Then the problem
is one of proof. Everyone knows that any child may open a lemonade
stand and that even our wealthiest citizens would hesitate to launch a
new venture in the manufacture of automobiles. In between lies a host of
57. Mann, Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry and Rates of Return, 48 REv.
EcoN. & STAT. 296, 300 (1966). Cf. Peltzman, Entry in Commercial Banking, 8
J. LAW & EcoN. 11, 42 (1965) ; Plott, Occupational Self-Regudation: A Case Study of
the Oklahoma Dry Cleaners, 8 3. LAW & EcoN. 195, 312-14 (1965).
58. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f1 17,465, at 22,719 (FTC 1966).
59. Id. at 22,728.
60. 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967).
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situations, varying perhaps abruptly from one product to a somewhat
similar one6 and difficult to assess. It is sometimes urged that steep
financial requirements impose barriers to entry. No doubt there is some
truth in that assertion. Note, however, how freely money flows into the
Communications Satellite Corporation." One is led to suspect that
factors of information, prestige, and the like are more important than
money.
Triggering Other Mergers
We have considered the question whether or not prior acquisitions
by the same defendant should be considered in anti-merger litigation.
We now consider the validity of the allegation that the challenged
merger will lead to similar activity on the part of persons not before the
court. The argument is that, if the attacked transaction is approved, the
decision will "trigger" similar moves by non-parties to the suit.
The subject is not academic for the courts have readily accepted the
notion that the possibility of "triggering" should be considered a factor
adverse to the validity of a merger. In the United States v. Continental
Can Co. case the United States Supreme Court wrote:
[a] merger between the second and sixth largest competitors in
a gigantic line of commerce is significant not only for its intrin-
sic effect on competition but also for its tendency to endanger a
much broader anticompetitive effect by triggering other mergers
by companies seeking the same competitive advantages.... 62
Other courts have expressed similar views.64
It is not easy to discover a rationale in support of such decisions. If
a merger creates an entity large enough to trigger other mergers, it seems
possible that it should be ruled unlawful on the simple ground that the
acquired firm has too big a market share. In other words, if a merger
61. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FOOD MARKETING, LIvESTOCK AND MEAT INDUSTRY,
TECHNICAL STUDY, NO. 1, at 11 (1966). Among the factors said to have improved ease of
entry into the meat packing industry are improved trucks and roads permitting the
erection of slaughter houses near farms where wage rates are lower. Id. 17.
62. Note the interesting empirical evidence presented in Fliegel & Kivlin, Attributcs
of Innovations as Factors in Diffusion, 72 Am. J. Soc. 235, 242 (1966). It is frequently
said that the existence of patents may make entry difficult. On the other hand,
it is often easy to invent around the claims of a patent.
63. 378 U.S. 441, 464 (1964).
64. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 447 (N.D. Cal.
1967) ; United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 657 (D.N.J. 1964) ; United
States v. Bethelehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), motion for
summary judgment denied, 157 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); General Foods Corp.,
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465, at 22,719 (FTC 1966) ; Fore-
most Dairies, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1344 (1963) ; FTC, EcoNoMIc REPORT ON MERGERS &
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY, STAFF REPORT TO THE FTC 14 (1966).
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brings into existence countervailing power, it is because it has created
some degree of monopoly power. If that is true, however, why have not
the other parties already merged? Can they only do so when shown how by
someone in their own industry? A more likely explanation is that
suggested above with respect to an acquisition creating barriers to entry.
Factors of indivisibility are present; their existence may only be establish-
ed by a successful merger. When other firms see that General Foods has
achieved economies by distributing steel wool pads along with its other
products to retailers, they may likewise start marketing the pads. Econo-
mies of scale may have existed for some period of time; it may take a
successful merger to demonstrate that they are real.
Different considerations may be applicable to vertical mergers. It is
often thought that when a firm acquires a customer or a supplier, its
rivals will, defensively, be encouraged to do likewise. If U.S. Steel
acquires a plant in which its ingot may be fabricated into pipe, then
Bethlehem may rush to buy a similar facility. Otherwise, it is urged,
Bethlehem will soon find itself "foreclosed" from selling ingot for fabri-
cation into pipe. Despite the fact that it is possible to cite instances in
which such triggering appears to have taken place," it will be seen
that the rationale depends upon the basic concept that vertical integration
can endanger competition. And while that concept is thoroughly accepted
by the courts,"0 it presents difficulties too complex for elaboration here.
Suppose that a second merger has actually taken place. Is this not
proof that the first merger might "trigger" others? Perhaps, but it is
entirely possible that the second merger might have been induced by
extraneous factors. 7 Technological change may have been the stimulus
to both mergers. What appears to be triggering may simply constitute
leading the parade.
Altogether, it is difficult to accept the notion that the possibility of trig-
gering is a separate ground for objecting to a merger. If the challenged
merger creates too large a market share, it should be illegal on that
ground alone. If it does not but somehow induces another merger, then
the second merger, not the first, should presumably be attacked because
the concept of triggering is based on the premise that the subsequent
merger, if not unlawful, is at least questionable. As in the case of prior
mergers by the acquiring firm, the possibility that non-parties may make
similar moves seems remote from the principal issues.
65. Union Carbide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614, 652 (1961). Cf. United States v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 789-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal.
1967).
67. Cf. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), rdv'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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CONCLUSIONS
What we hope to have demonstrated is that the relevance of
evidence offered in aggravation of mergers should be carefully scrutinized.
Some types of testimony are dearly material to the goals of anti-merger
legislation. Others appear extraneous. A good deal may depend upon
one's faith in the "structure" test of injury to competition. Those who
believe firmly that the process of counting heads suffices to indicate the
existence of a degree of monopoly power will be content to disregard
most of the evidence usually offered to indicate that a merger is worse
than the market shares indicate.
On the other hand, those with little faith in "structure" will insist
upon looking at factors suggesting the character of the defendant's
"performance." If we concede any relevance at all to "performance," it
is difficult to justify exclusion of the evidence. There then remains only
the question of how much weight should be accorded to it.
